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court may have adopted the minority rule for fear of setting a liberal
precedent which might prohibit the construction of many needed
public improvements and to avoid the problems encountered when
California earlier adopted a liberal rule for compensation in the
land right of way cases. 23 That situation resulted in an increasingly
restrictive judicial attitude concerning the right to compensation.
24
Colberg is significant in that it reflects the merging of the three
rules into the minority rule. The court has recognized the need for
a state to meet its responsibility of acting in the best interest of all its
people. If these penumbral property rights are recognized, the cost
of public improvements would become prohibitive and commerce
would be considerably impeded.
THoMAS C. SPENCER
RIGHT OF ELECTION AGAINST A FOREIGN
TESTATOR'S WILL
New York's Decedent Estate Law, section 47 ostensibly allows
a testator's intention to control the law to be applied in governing
the validity and effect of his will. The pertinent portion of section
47 provides:
Whenever a decedent, being a citizen of the United States or
a citizen or a subject of a foreign country, wherever resident,
shall have declared in his will and testament that he elects that
such testamentary dispositions shall be construed and regu-
lated by the laws of this state, the validity and effect of such
dispositions shall be determined by such laws.'
In re Estate of Clarkj2 presents a novel conflict of laws question
concerning the interpretation of section 47. The decedent, a Virginia
domiciliary, died leaving an estate which consisted of real and personal
property in Virginia and personal property in New York. In his
last will and testament the decedent established a testamentary trust
for the benefit of his widow. The trust satisfied the requirements of
the New York right of election statute, and thus the widow was
2Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274, 57 P. 82 (1899); Eachus v.
Los Angeles Consol. Elec. Ry., io 3 Cal. 614, 37 P. 750 (1894); Reardon v. San
Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
2See Note, 38 S. Cal. L. Rev. 689 (1965), discussing the development of Cali-
fornia law on compensation for loss of right of access to land.
'Law of 1911, ch. 244 [1911] Laws of N.Y. (repealed 1967) [now N.Y. EST.,
PoWERs & TRUSTS LAw § 3 -5 .1(h) (McKinney 1967)].
221 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
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precluded from asserting an election against the will under New York
law.3 Under applicable Virginia law the surviving spouse had an
absolute and unconditional right to renounce the will and assert
a statutory share of the estate. 4 The Virginia election was made, and
notice of it was timely filed. However, the testator's will provided that
the will, the included testamentary dispositions, and the -trusts shall be
construed and regulated by the laws of the state of New York.5 In light
of this provision the New York executors challenged the widow's
right to renounce the will and assert the statutory share allowed by the
law of Virginia. The executors sought a determination under section
47 that the widow's right to elect be denied. The Surrogate Court
of New York County, in a cursory disposal of the issue, held that,
although -the surviving spouse had under Virginia law the absolute
right to renounce, the exercise of this right had been effectively barred
by the decedent's expression that the laws of New York should apply.6
The widow appealed, and the supreme court, in a divided opinion,
held that since the surviving spouse's right of election is not a
testamentary disposition, section 47 did not apply and Virginia law
would govern the widow's right of election.7 This decision was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals of New York.8
The generally accepted conflict of laws doctrine is that the right
of a surviving spouse to elect against a foreign testator's will be-
queathing personality is governed by the law of his domicile at the
date of his death.0 This common law concept is a more specific appli-
3Law of 1929, ch. 229, § 4 [1929] Laws of N.Y. (repealed 1967) [now N.Y. EST.,
PowERs & TRUSrs LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967)]. This section affords the testator
the power to defeat the surviving spouse's right to elect against the will by the
creation of a trust of a satisfactory size which provides the spouse with its net
income.
'VA. CODE ANN. § 64-16 (1950) provides:
If renunciation be made, or if no provision for the surviving husband
or wife be made in the will of the decedent, the surviving consort shall,
if the decedent left surviving any direct descendants or a legally adopted
child, or descendants of any deceased adopted child, have one-third of
the surplus of the decedent's personal estate mentioned in § 64-11; or if
no direct descendants or adopted child of the testator, or descendants of
a deceased adopted child, survive, the surviving consort shall have one-half
of such surplus; otherwise the surviving consort shall have no more of
the surplus than is given him or her by the will.
5In re Estate of Clark, 52 Misc. 2d 583, 276 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sur. Ct. 1966).
GId.
7 1n re Clark's Will, 28 App. Div. 2d 55, 281 N.Y.S.2d 18o (Sup. Ct. 1967).
'In re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968).
'RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 301 (1934); 6 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE
ON WILS § 60.21, at 485 (1962). Concerning the right of election against a will
devising realty, the determination is governed by the law of the situs of the
1968]
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cation of the fundamental notion, long recognized by the New York
Court,10 that the right of intestate succession and testamentary
transmission of personalty, in the absence of statute or contrary intent,
is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile."
In the resolution of conflict of laws problems a modern approach
is to avoid the conventional doctrine in favor of the center of gravity
or grouping of contacts theory.12 The foundation for this approach
is that the laws that should be controlling are those of the jurisdiction
having the dominant interest in the outcome of a particular litigation.
New York courts have been receptive to this approach.13
There is an argument that can be made for the application of
New York law, even if the modern "gravity" or "contacts" theory is
used; New York was the situs of the disputed property and New York
has a policy of encouraging trust business in its jurisdiction. Carried
to its logical extreme, the Clark decision is likely to have a detri-
realty. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 253 (1934); 6 W. BowIE & D. PARKER,
PAGE ON WILLS § 60.21, at 482-83 (1962).
"In re Sahadi's Estate, 3o Misc. 2d 166, 125 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sur. Ct. 1953); In re
Weiss' Will, 64 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sur. Ct. 1946); In re Adams' Estate, 182 Misc. 937,
45 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sur. Ct. 1943), af'd meM., 267 App. Div. 985, 48 N.Y.S.2d 8oi
(Sup. Ct. 1944), motion for leave to appeal denied, 268 App. Div. 849, 50 N.Y.S.2d
673 (Sup. Ct. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 865 (1945); In re Slade's Estate, 154
Misc. 275, 276 N.Y.S. 956 (Sur. Ct. 1935); In re Thorold's Estate, 147 Misc. 899,
265 N.Y.S. 39 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
"In re Hollister, 18 N.Y.2d 281, 221 N.E.2d 376 (1966); Caulfield v. Sullivan,
84 N.Y. 153 (188); Despard v. Churchill, 53 N.Y. 192 (1873); Parsons v. Lyman, 20
N.Y. 103 (1859); In re Barandon's Estate, 41 Misc. 380, 84 N.Y.S. 937 (Sur. Ct. 19o3).
"It is an established doctrine, not only of international law but of the municipal
law of this country, that personal property has no locality. It is subject to the law
which governs the person of the owner, as well in respect to the disposition of it
by act inter vitos, as to its transmission by last will and testament, and by succes-
sion upon the owner dying intestate." Parsons v. Lyman, 2o N.Y. 103, 112 (1859).
This concept of nobilia personarn sequuntur-personal property follows the
domicile of the person-is subject to the testator's contrary intent. In re Feuer-
mann's Will, 47 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sur. Ct. 1944). As concerns the validity and effect
of the testamentary disposition of real property and the manner in which it
descends, the governing law is that of the situs of the realty. In re Gallagher's
Estate, 1o Misc. 2d 422, 169 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sur. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d
1029, 184 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1959); In re Master's Will, 136 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sur.
Ct. 1954).
The center of gravity theory has been applied in several areas of law. Bowles
v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7 th Cir. 196o) (tortious occurrence arising from
contract); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (intra-family
immunity from tort); Aleckson v. Kennedy Motor Sales Co., 238 Minn. 210, 55
N.W.2d 696 (1952) (workmen's compensation).
"Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 24o N.Y.S.2d 473 (1963);
Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961) (contract);
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1961) (wrongful death action); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99,
117 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1954) (contract).
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mental effect on New York trust business by discouraging the creation
of testamentary trusts to evade the restrictions imposed by other juris-
dictions. However, Clark relied on "Virginia's overwhelming inter-
est"1 4 to help reach a decision. Indeed, the domicile's relationship with
the result seems quite acute, for if the widow were cut off entirely from
participation in the decedent's estate by his decision to subject his
will to the law of a state having no election statute, the domicile
would likely bear the expense of supporting a public charge.
Under either the traditional conflict of laws rule that the law
of the decedent's domicile controls or the more recent center of gravity
concept, it appears that the Clark decision, applying Virginia law, is
proper. The vital question then presented is whether such a result is
changed by section 47, in light of the testator's expression that New
York law should govern the validity and effect of his will.
Although there are no cases involving the precise choice of laws
problem confronted in Clark, a study of previous lower New York
court decisions interpreting the pertinent statute reveals language in-
dicating that a foreign testator may, by the use of section 47, avoid
disadvantageous laws of his domicile. In In re Tabbagh's Estate'5 a
surrogate court ruling recognized that a testator, who died domiciled
in France, could establish a testamentary trust which, although pro-
hibited by French law, would be valid in New York. In re Smith's
Estate10 involved the will of a testator domiciled in Spain at date
of death. The will obviously attempted to avoid the widow's right to
elect by submission of the will to the laws of New York. The attempt
was, however, unsuccessful because the New York right of election
statute' 7 had become effective four months prior to the writing of
the will, and the widow was held to have the right to elect under this
statute. More in point is In re Cook's Estate,8 in which the testator,
domiciled in Cuba, attempted to avoid a restriction placed on his right
to bequeath. Under Cuban law the status of a decedent's child was
that of a forced heir entitled to lgitime in two-thirds of the estate.19
"'In re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (s968)•
uIn re Tabbagh's Estate, 167 Misc. 156, 3 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sur. Ct. 1938).
"In re Smith's Estate, 182 Misc. 711, 48 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sur. Ct. 1944).
"Law of 1929, ch. 229, § 4 [1929] Laws of N.Y. (repealed 1967) [now N.Y.
EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW. § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967)].
-204 Misc. 704, 123 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sur. Ct. 1953), aff'd mem., 283 App. Div.
1047, 131 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
"Salatich v. Hellen, 4 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Cal. 1933); Bauman v. Pennywell,
16o La. 555, 107 So. 425 (1926). A forced heir is one to whom the law reserves a
particular portion in the decedent's estate. The forced heir cannot be deprived
of this portion other than by his own consent. The particular portion reserved by
law is called idgitime.
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The testator sought to ignore this limitation by expressing in his
will that it be regulated by the laws of New York. The child's special
guardian, in reliance on the domicile's restriction on the power to
bequeath, challenged the testamentary disposition. In denying this
challenge the lower court commented upon the availability of section
47 as a method to avoid the laws of the testator's domicile:
In this proceeding the court is asked to say whether this pro-
vision affords residents of other jurisdictions a means of escaping
onerous restrictions on the testamentary disposition of property
imposed by the laws of their own domiciles. The answer is that
the statute does exactly that when the estate left by the testator
is subjected to control by the courts of this state as it was in this
case ... by the direction as to the governing law.
2 0
Although none of these lower court decisions were mentioned by the
court of appeals, the result in Clark is clearly inconsistent with In
re Cook's Estate, and that case should no longer be considered good
law. The decision does not affect In re Tabbagh's Estate since the
question there did not concern a widow's right of election, while In re
Smith's Estate can be distinguished on the ground that the surviving
spouse adopted the testator's election to have New York law apply.
The court in Clark placed primary emphasis on the finding that a
widow's right of election is not a testamentary disposition.21 Thus sec-
tion 47, which is expressly applicable to testamentary dispositions,
does not affect the right of a surviving spouse to assert a statutory
election. In -this reasoning the court appears correct. Precedent indi-
cates that the nature of the right of election statutes is one of legisla-
tive restriction on the power of the testator to dispose of his assets.
2 -
This is aptly phrased in In re Lavine's Will:
Section 18 [New York's election statute] of the Decedent
Estate Law ... marked a somewhat radical departure from the
previously existing latitude of authority for the personal direc-
tion of testamentary devolution by a decedent, and amounted
"0123 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
"21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993, 997 (1968).
"Mitchell v. Mitchell, 265 App. Div. 27, 37 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
aff'd bern., 29o N.Y. 779, 50 N.E.2d io6 (1943); In re Topazio's Estate, 175 Misc. 132,
22 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sur. Ct. 1940). It is important to note that the right to make a
will is purely statutory and subject to the complete control of the legislature.
Able v. Bane, 123 Ind. App. 585, RIO N.E.2d 3o6 (1953); In re Erstein's Estate, 205
Misc. 924, 129 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sur. Ct. 1954). Statutory restrictions upon the power
or capacity of a testator to dispose of his property exist in other forms. For
example, see S.C. CoDE ANN. § 19-238 (1962) (restriction on legacy to bastards
or to woman living in adultery); CAL. PROBATE CODE § 41 (West 1956) (restrictions
on charitable bequest).
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in effect -to a statutory limitation upon the power of an owner
to direct the mode of distribution of his net estate ... 23
The basic purpose behind the right of election statutes also indi-
cates that the right to inherit despite the will is characteristically a
limitation on the power to dispose of property. The scheme suggests
a legislative decision that the testator should not be able to avoid
his obligation to support his sponse by disinheritance; 24 protection
of the surviving spouse by providing proper support was the end
sought.25 This being the ultimate aim of the statutes, they would
be rendered meaningless if a testator were allowed to declare in
his will that it be construed by the laws of a jurisdiction which had
no election statute. Such a testamentary power has been subjected
to at least one criticism:
It seems odd that the will should govern the forced share the
widow may take by renouncing it. If this were carried to its
logical extreme a testator could elect the law of a state giving
no right to elect and leave substantial personalty there to avoid
the widow's share by the domicile. The policies behind the
statutory forced share give the domicile a dominent interest,
and it seems somewhat of a bootstrap doctrine to permit the
testator to determine by his will the law governing his widow's
right to renounce. 26
The court in Clark strengthened its decision by an examination
of recent changes, enacted after the testator's death, in New York's
own election statute.27 In 1965 the state legislature amended the sec-
tion to prohibit a foreign testator's surviving spouse from exercising
M16 7 Misc. 879, 4 N.Y.S.2d 923, 926 (Sur. Ct. 1938) .
lIn re Boesenberg's Estate, 179 Misc. 3, 37 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sur. Ct. 1942), rev'd
on other grounds, 265 App. Div. 484, 39 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
nIn re Greenberg's Estate, 261 N.Y. 474, 185 N.E. 70.4 (933); In re Jackson's
Will, 177 Misc. 480, 31 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sur. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 264 App. Div. 783, 34
N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1942); In re Moore's Estate, 165 Misc. 683, 1 N.Y.S.2d 281
(Sur. Ct. 1937), aff'd iner., 254 App. Div. 856, 6 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1938),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 255 App. Div. 774, 7 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct.
1938), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 733, 21 N.E.2d 512 (1939). In re Greenberg's Estate
offers a classic example of the protection offered the widow. There the testator
died leaving a wife and five children. The will, which contained a Si legacy for
the widow, expressed the testator's disappointment in her failure to provide
him with a "blissful and contented home." In holding that the excution of a
codicil after the effective date of the election statute constituted a republication
of the will so the widow would be able to assert a statutory share, the court
said, "Here, however, the purpose of the Legislature was the protection of the
widow." 261 N.Y. 474, 185 N.E. 704, 705 (1933).
2Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Elections in Administration of Decedents' Estates,
30 IND. L.J. 293, 307 (1955)-
-'Law of 1929, ch. 229, § 4 [1929] Laws of N.Y. (repealed 1967) [now N.Y.
EsT., PowERs 9: TRUsTS LAw § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967)].
1968]
334 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXV
election rights offered by that section. 2s In 196629 and 196730 the
prohibition was affirmed by the legislature. As indicated in Clark,
the primary reason for these enactments was not to deprive the spouse
of a New York election, but to insure that her right under the law of
the testator's domicile would not be abrogated. 31 In 1967 section
5-1.1(d)(6) of the new Estates, Powers and Trusts Law was amended
and presently provides:
The right of election granted by this section is not available
to the spouse of a decedent who was not domiciled in this state
at the time of death, unless such decedent elects, under para-
graph (h) of 3-5.1 [formerly Section 47], to have disposition of
his property situated in this state governed by the laws of
this state.32
This action by the legislature was interpreted by the court as a
decision to make available to the spouse the right to elect under
either the laws of New York or the laws of the domicile.33 Thus,
the widow of a foreign testator who wants his will to be regulated by
the laws of New York is given a choice as to which law will apply con-
cerning her right to take against the will. Although this most recent
amendment could, within reason, be interpreted to limit the right of
election exclusively to New York law, the more rational construction,
consistent with the basic purpose of protecting the spouse, was wisely
adopted.
The broader question presented in Clark, whether an established
conflict of laws rule is changed by statute, although not one fre-
quently encountered, will probably be litigated eventually in other
jurisdictions. Indeed, the recent Virginia decision of French v. Short
3 4
presented a situation in which close scrutiny of the appropriate
statutes could have resulted in an opposite outcome. In French the
decedent died domiciled in Florida and by will attempted to dispose
of real and personal property in Virginia. Because the will did not
comply with the Florida statute of wills, it was not admitted to pro-
bate there, but the Florida court permitted the will to be presented
to the appropriate Virginia court for probate. The lower Virginia
court admitted the writing to probate as to all of the decedent's
21In re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993, 1000
(1968).
"'Law of 1966, ch. 517, § 6, [1966] Laws of N.Y. 1229.
3°N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
3288 N.Y.S.2d at ooo.
"N.Y. Esr., POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 5 -1.1(d)(6) (McKinney 1967), as amtended,
Law of 1967, ch. 686, §§ 38, 39 [1967] Laws of N.Y. 943 (emphasis omitted).
288 N.Y.S.2d at 1oo.
'207 Va. 548, 151 S.E.2d 354 (1966).
